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Case No. 6220 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. L. C IBSOl\. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE-
ME~T BOARD. L E R 0 Y E. 
CO"rLES, CHARLES H. SKID-
MORE. JOSEPH CHEZ, ALEX 
JEX, .\IILTON B. TAYLOR, D. 
A. WOOTTON, and J. R. 
SMITH, members thereof, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF of PLAINTIFF 
APPLICATION FOH \VRIT OF MANDATE 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
MAHL D. GIBSON. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. L. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE-
MENT BOARD, L E R 0 Y E. 
COWLES, CHARLES H. SKID-
MORE, JOSEPH CHEZ, ALEX 
JEX, MILTON B. TAYLOR, D. 
A. WOOTTON, and J. R. 
SMITH, members thereof, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF of PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
6220 
The plaintiff at all times herein mentioned has 
been and now is a teacher employed by the public schools 
of the State of Utah. 
On or about the first day of November, 1923. the 
plaintiff became a holder of a retirement annuity con-
tract with the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Asso-
ciation of America and the University of Utah contrib-
uted one half of each monthly premium up to and in-
cluding the payment made during December of 193'7. 
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Since said payment made in December of 1937 neither 
the plaintiff nor the University of Utah nor any sub-
division of the State of Utah has contributed any part 
of any premium on this contract. 
In 1937 the state legislature of the State of Utah 
passed an act known as the Teachers' Retirement Act 
(Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937) setting. up a Utah 
State Teachers' Retirement System providing for the 
retirement of the teachers employed by the· public schools 
of the State of Utah. Pursuant to said law plaintiff 
made application for membership in said system and 
a hearing was held by the Teachers' Retirement Board 
on said application. That as a result of said hearing the 
Teachers' Retirement Board denied his application for 
membership. 
The plaintiff thereafter brought an action for de-
claratory judgment in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County requesting said Court to declare and determine 
his status in regard to said system. The District Court 
dismissed said petition on the grounds that it had no 
jurisdiction in such a hearing of said matter. 
The plaintiff has tendered and still tenders to the 
Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board in full any and 
all sums necessary to pay his contributions in said system 
if he is a member. 
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THE LAW 
Section 11. Membership. 
With the exception of those teachers who are 
excluded from membership by the provisions of 
section 12 hereof, all teachers become members of 
the retirement system as follows: 
(a) Every teacher who is employed in the 
public schools of this state on July 1, 1937, shall 
become a member of the retirement system on 
that date. 
(b) Every teacher who shall become em-
ployed in the public schools of this state after 
July 1, 1937, shall become a member of the re-
tirement system on the effective date of such 
employment. 
Section 12. Teachers Excluded From Membership. 
The following teachers shall be excluded 
from membership in the retirement system: 
(a) Every teacher employed on a part-
time or substitute basis who was not already a 
member when he entered the part-time or sub-
stitute status. 
(h) Every teacher who is the holder of a re-
tirement annuity contract with the Teachers' In-
surance and Annuity Association of America or 
with any other private organization or company, 
in which the State of Utah, or any subdivision 
thereof contributes part of the premium, under 
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6 
said contract; provided, however, that every such 
teacher, upon ceasing to be a holder of such 
contract and being otherwise eligible to member-
ship in this system, shall forthwith become a mem-
ber of the system. 
(c) Every teacher serving as an exchange 
from outside the state. 
(d) Every teacher who is a contributing 
member. of a local system, subject to the pro-
visions of section 13 hereof. 
ARGUMENT 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff against 
the defendants to force them to accept the plaintiff as 
a member of said system and to do for him the acts re-
quired of them by laws as provided in the Teachers' 
Retirement Act, Laws of Utah, 1937, Chapter 85. 
The facts involved in this case are without dispute 
and the only question involved is a question of law, 
whether or not under the facts herein the plaintiff is 
entitled to be a member of the Utah State Teachers' 
Retirement .System. The Teachers' Retirement Board 
claims that it is the sole judge and its decisions are con-
clusive as to whether or not any person is a member 
or is eligible for membership in said system and that by 
virture of its alleged hearing in this matter in which it 
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1 
declared the plaintiff not eligible for membership he is 
conclusively bound by such hearing and decision. We 
claim that the legislature defined and settled who were 
members of the retirement system and that the defend-
ants have no right to say who is or who is not a member. 
There are no questions of fad that are involved, 
but only questions of law. At the time of the alleged 
hearing before the defendants the only question in-
volved was one of law which could not be passed by the 
defendants. 
Paragraph 4 of the defendants' claimed findings 
of fact is as follows: 
"That Mr. Gibson ceased making premium 
payments to the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America on said policy on or about 
the 29th day of December, 1937, and caused the 
University of Utah to ceased contributing its part 
of the premiums to said Association on or about 
the 29th day of December, 1937, but retained said 
contract so as to claim and receive the deferred 
annuity provided therein on the basis of the con-
tributions made to December 29, 1937." 
This paragraph shows that there was not any ques-
tion of fact to be determined. The portion of the said 
paragraph which states "but retained said contract so 
as to claim and receive the deferred annuity provided 
therein on the basis of the contributions made to Decem-
ber 29, 1937'" is not only contrary to the evidence before 
the Board, but is a figment of the imagination and a 
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8 
conclusion of law. Both sides are in agreement as to tht 
facts, but were in dispute as to the law. That is still 
the case. 
The Teachers' Retirement Act in section 8 gives the 
board "the power and authority to hear and determine 
all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under 
the retirement system - - - ." It does not say that after 
determining the facts it has the authority to determine 
eligibility which would be a question of law, so as 
to make it a final adjudication. Sections 4 and 8 both 
authorize the board to hold a hearing to determine facts 
when an application has been made for benefits, but do 
not give it authority to determine who are members. 
The legislature has done that for the board in sections 
11 and 12 of the act and the board acts in excess of its 
authority if it presumes the right to exclude any one 
who is eligible under the provisions of said sections. 
There is no prov1s1on of the act which authorizes 
a hearing to determine membership. 
The applicant was not making an application for 
benefits when he applied for membership. He is not yet 
eligible for benefits, not having retired. In making an 
application he was attempting to bring the matter to 
issue and convince the defendants that he was eligible 
and that it should comply with the provisions of sections 
1?, 18 and 19 of the act. 
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9 
The hoard under the terms of section 8 has the 
authority to determine "matters pertaining to the admin-
istration" of the act and consequently could probably re-
quire an application for membership for administrative 
purposes. But under such administrative authority it 
could not hold a judicial hearing and adjudicate the 
plaintiff out of rights granted to him by law. 
We claim that there is no question involved as to 
whether or not the board is a quasi judicial body because 
no matter what it is it has no more authority than 
granted to it by the act and that which is necessarily 
inferred therefrom, and the act does not provide for 
such an alleged hearing. See U. of U. v. Ind. Com. of 
Utah. 64 U. 2?3, 229 P. 1103. 
The defendants have assumed the right in their 
alleged findings of fact and conclusions of law to construe 
a contract of insurance and state: 
"4. That Mr. Gibson ceased making pre-
mium payments to the Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Association of America on said policy 
on or about the 29th day of December, 1937, and 
caused the University of Utah to cease contribut-
ing its part of the premiums to said Association 
on or about the 29th day of December, 1937, hut 
retained said contract so as to claim and receive 
the deferred annuity provided therein on the 
basis of the contributions made to December 29, 
1937." 
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"Conclusions 
"From the foregoing Findings of Fact the 
Board concludes that Mr. Gibson's said contract 
with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Asso-
ciation of America was not cancelled or wiped out 
by the stopping of premium payments on the 
date so mentioned in Finding No. 3; that not-
withstanding the stopping of premium payments 
on the said dates, Mr. Gibson was and is entitled 
to the future benefits provided for in said con-
tract; that said contract is not subject to im-
mediate cancellation and does not cease to vield 
benefits to Mr. Gibson under its terms by r~ason 
of failure to pay premiums: that the benefits 
provided for in said contract are subject to re-
establishment to their full extent in the manner 
specified in said contract; that the said James L. 
Gibson was, at the time his application for mem-
bership in the Utah Teachers' Retirement System 
was filed, and is now, a holder of a retirement 
annuity contract with the Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America; and that 
the said James L. Gibson, as a holder of a con-
tract with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America, is excluded from mem-
bership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
System under the provisions of Section 12 of the 
Teachers' Retirement Act, Chapter 85, Session 
Laws of Utah, 1937." 
We have a Utah Supreme Court case which shows 
that said alleged findings of fact and conclusions are 
right in the teeth of the settled law of this state and the 
acts of the defendants are in excess of their authority. 
It is: 
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Continental Casualty Co. v. Ind. Com. of Utah, 
61 U. 16, 210 P. 12?: 
"The Industrial Commission, being an admin-
istrative body, is, tcithout authority to construe 
and apply a contract of insurance to cover work-
men in the employ of one not named as the in-
sured, and therefore an award against insurer for 
death of au employee of the independent con-
tractor operating mine under contract with the 
insured is unauthorized, though the policy de-
scribed the mine at the place of employment." 
Section 11 of the statute says "With the exception 
of those teachers who are excluded from membership 
by the provisions of section 12 hereof, all teachers shall 
become members of the retirement system - - - ." 
Section 12 states: 
"The following teachers shall be excluded 
from membership 1n the retirement system: 
"(a) 
"(b) Every teacher who is the holder of a 
retirement annuity contract with the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America or 
with any other private organization or company, 
in which the State of Utah, or any subdivision 
thereof contributes parts of the premium, under 
said contract; provided, however, that every such 
teacher, upon ceasing to be the holder of such 
contract and being otherwise eligible to member-
ship in this system, shall forthwith become a 
member of the system. 
"(c) - - - -
"(d) - - - -
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In· subsection (b) . the clause· "in which the State 
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof contributes part of 
the premium, under said contract" modifies both the 
preceding clauses so that the subsection means: "The 
following teachers shall be excluded from membership 
in the retirement system: (b) Every teacher who is the 
holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America in which 
the State of Utah contributes part of the premium under 
said contract, provided, however, - - - ," 
59 C. ]. 980 says: 
"Where several words are connected hv a 
copulative conjunction they are presumed t~ be 
of the same class." Likewise in Carbon v. Shelton, 
107 S. W. 793, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509, and also 
all the cases in the note in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509. 
The word "contributes" used is in the present tense 
and not in the past. The words "is the holder" are also 
in the present tense. 
The fact is admitted that neither the plaintiff nor 
the State of Utah, nor any subdivision thereof, has con-
tributed any part of any premium since the latter part 
of December, 1937. The law provides that under such 
circumstances the teacher "Shall forthwith become a 
member of the system." The plaintiff maintains that 
under this section he is a member of the retirement sys-
tem. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Defendants contend ·that the plaintiff is still the 
holder of a retiren1ent annuity contract with the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America and is, 
therefore, not eligible for membership in the Teachers' 
Retirement System. The Court will note in going over 
the contract introduced in evidence with the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America that it 
is a form contract used by the association. The defendants 
claim that the said contract "is not subject to assignment 
or cancellations," and therefore, the plaintiff cannot 
dispossess himself of rights accrued prior to December, 
193'7 under the terms of said contract. Certainly the leg-
islature in passing subsection (b) of section twelve had 
in mind the terms of said form contracts and contem-
plated that persons might do, and were entitled to do, 
just as the plaintiff has done here, so as to become 
a member of the state system. If such were not the case 
and not the law the statement "that every such teacher, 
upon ceasing to be a holder of such contract and being 
otherwise eligible to membership in this system, shall 
forthwith become a member of the system," could have 
no meaning whatsoever. The plaintiff has done every-
thing that the defendants claim that it is possible for 
him to do or for anyone else to do to dispossess himself 
of the contract with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association of America and is certainly a member of the 
Teachers' Retirement System if the provisions in sub-
section (b), Section 12 means anything. 
Under the defendants' contention in this case no 
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person who had a contract with the Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America could possibly 
"cease to be a holder of such contract" under the terms 
of said subsection, and, therefore, it would mean noth-
ing. 
The defendants apparently claim that the plaintiff 
would get something to which he is not entitled if he 
should be determined a member of the Teachers' Re-
tirement System. We submit to the Court that the 
Teachers' Retirement System and the wording thereof 
take care of this in that the amount to which plaintiff 
would be entitled is determined by the years of prior 
service and the years of prior service are determined 
not by the number of years which he has been a teacher 
but by the number of years which he has been a teacher 
and not a holder of a retirement annuity contract with 
the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association of 
America in which the State of Utah contributes part of 
said premiums. We submit to the Court that if the plain-
tiff is not a member of the state system he would not 
receive nearly as much money in the form of a pension 
after his approximately 36 years of long and faithful 
service as would another man belonging to the said 
system who had spent a like time which would con-
stitute an unfair discrimination within a class making 
the provisions of the statute unconstitutional. 
59 c. ]. 9'?0: 
"The court will, if possible, place upon the 
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statute a construction which ·will not result in 
injustice, oppression, hardship or inconvenience." 
Certainly the plaintiff is at least entitled to benefits 
for the thirty-six years' service, less the period from 1921 
to 1937, both inclusive, when the state paid into the 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, 
so as to bring his pension up to what other persons of like 
service would receive. 
The legislature must have had within its contem-
plation, at the time of passing said subsection, a situa-
tion like the one now before the court and passed said 
provisions so that if a man with a Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America contract would not 
receive as much as he would under the terms of a state 
contract he could "cease to be a holder of said contract 
- - - - and forthwith become a member of the system" 
by doing the only thing that the defendants claim IS 
possible for him to do. This the plaintiff has done. 
He has complied with the statute in every particular 
and particularly said subsection (h), and therefore, as 
a matter of law, he is a member of the State Teachers' 
Retirement System, and is entitled to have this Court 
declare him to be such a member and to require the 
defendants to acknowledge him as such. 
Teachers' Retirement Acts should be construed lib-
era1ly toward applicants. (Wards v. Teachers' Retirement 
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Board, 241 N. Y. S. 535; In re Sanborn, 159 Wash. 112, 
292 P. 259.) 
The plaintiff contends that the plain, clear and 
unambiguous meaning of the Teachers' Retirement Act is 
as he claims, and more especially so under a liberal 
construction, and that any other meaning would be 
strained and artificial. "Where the language of a statute 
it plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for con-
struction, even though other meanings could be found 
and the court cannot indulge in speculation as to the 
probable or possible qualification which might have been 
in the mind of the legislature, but that statute must be 
given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning, 
and cannot be extended beyond it because of some sup-
posed policy of the law, or because the legislature did 
not use proper words to express its meaning, or the court 
would be assuming legislative authority." 59 C.]. 9?0. 
If the court were to find that it be possible that the 
defendants construction is correct ,then the plaintiff 
contends that such a construction is unconstitutional and 
that for that reason the plaintiff's theory should prevail. 
"Where validity of a statute is assailed and there are 
two possible interpretations, one by which the statute 
would be unconstitutional and by the other it would be 
valid, the court should adopt the construction which 
would uphold it." 11 Am. ]ur. Constitutional Law, Section 
9'?. Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 U 
491, 15 p (2d) 633. 
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"The duty of the courts so to construe a 
statute as to save its constitutionality when it is 
reasonably susceptible to two constructions in-
cludes the duty of adopting a construction that 
will not subject it to a succession of doubts as to 
its constitutionality, for it is well settled that a 
statute must be construed if fairly possible, so 
as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is un-
constitutional but also grave doubts upon that 
score." 11 Am. }ur. Constitutional Law, Sec. 9'?. 
If this statute is subject to the interpretation claimed 
by the defendants, the plaintiff alleges that it is uncon-
stitutional in that it violates the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. This clause does not prevent the states 
from distinguishing, selecting, and classifying objects of 
legislation within a wide range of discretion; but a class-
ification must be based upon some reasonable ground, 
some difference which bears a just and proper relation 
to the classification and not a mere arbitrary selection. 
(Field v. Barber, etc., Co., 194 U. S. 618.) The classifica-
tion must be reasonable in relation to the purposes sought 
to be accomplished by the statute. 
In this case the general class to which the act applies 
ts teachers. Any attempt to subdivide such a natural 
class and to enact different rules for each subdivision is 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
"The legislature cannot take what might be 
· termed a: natural class of persons, split that class 
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in two and then arbitrarily designate the disserv-
ered sections of the original unit as two classes 
and thereupon enact different rules for the gov-
ernment of each." 12 Am. fur. Constitutional Law, 
Sec. 482. 
In the act now before the Court "there are two 
types of teachers who had annuity contracts, part of 
the premium of which was paid by public funds. These 
two groups are those having annuity contracts with the 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of Ameria 
and those who are members of "Local Systems." 
The statute specifically provides in Section 1J how 
members of local systems may become members of the 
Teachers' Retirement System. There is no reasonable 
basis for distinction between members of this system 
and teachers holding contracts with the Teachers In-
surance and Annuity Association of America, except that 
the latter have contracts with a private organization 
and the former with a public organization, and such a 
distinction could not be termed reasonable. Any attempts 
to differentiate between and give different rights to 
these two groups of teachers can have no reasonable 
foundation and are clearly arbitrary. 
Teachers in the University of Utah are eligible for 
contracts with the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Asso-
ciation of America and many of them attempted to pro· 
vide for their old age by buying and contributing to 
contracts in said organization, others less diligent ignored 
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their opportunities and made no attempts to save money 
and to protect themselves. 
Those who have been diligent, saved and attempted 
to be self-supporting and not to become a burden on the 
state, could not, if the defendants' interpretation is cor-
rect, ever, or in any manner, become members of the 
Teachers' Retirement System. Under their contracts 
many would get only a small annuity for the remain-
der of their lives, and the State would be penalizing those 
who in their past lives have been careful, thrifty and 
foresighted, and would reward those who have been 
careless and shortsighted by paying to them a monthly 
sum considerably in excess of that which those who 
were careful and thrifty, can ever hope to obtain. 
Hence it is seen that any attempts to find a reason-
able basis for the said classification must fail, and that 
the act if it is interpreted in the manner defendants 
desire must be unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has held in the case of Con-
tinental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
61 U. 16, 210 P. 12?, supra, that the Industrial Com-
mission being an administrative body could not con-
strue a contract of insurance and it would, therefore, 
necessarily follow in this case that the Teachers' Re-
tirement Board could certainly not construe the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association of America contract 
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and draw conclusions of law from it. It is less a judicial 
body than is the Industrial Commission which exercised 
many quasi judicial functions. 
The Teachers' Retirement Act does not provide for 
any method of appeal or time in which an appeal could 
be made or taken. The lack of such provisions lends 
much weight to the claim of plaintiff that the Teachers' 
Retirement Board has no authority to determine any 
questions except those of fact and then only in cases 
in which applications for benefits have been made. 
Defendants rely to a great extent on the fact that 
plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County was dismissed by the 
judge. Defendants seem to forget that said case was dis-
missed at their request on the grounds that the District 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine such 
a matter. The said hearing can have no bearing upon 
this matter whatsoever, except to show due diligence 
on the part of the plaintiff. Defendants' findings of 
fact and conclusions of law rendered as a result of the 
hearing before them were not rendered or given or served 
on the plaintiff until immediately prior to the hearing 
in the District Court and at such time said decision, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were apparently 
rendered for the sole and only purpose of enabling and 
assisting them to fight said case and to have some 
grounds to contest said case in the District Court. This 
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21 
was more than a year after said decision was rendered 
by the Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board. 
Defendants claim that plaintiff has no right to 
have this court determine his status as a member of 
said system because of laches in applying for said writs 
after the said hearing before the Teachers' Retirement 
Board. We submit, however, under the law that the 
plaintiff was a member of said system and as such is 
not required to do or cause the courts to do anything in 
regard to said system until he is applying for benefits 
which he has not yet done. We further submit that if the 
question of laches were well taken the plaintiff is not 
guilty of such due to the fact that he immediately went 
to the District Court of the State of Utah and attempted 
to get a determination of this matter and that said 
District Court declared itself without jurisdiction to 
hear the same. Furthermore, the question of laches arises 
only in equitable proceedings and this is a writ at law 
and thus laches are inapplicable and have no bearing 
on the matter. 
The plaintiff is clearly entitled to the relief prayed 
for in his application for writ of mandate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
MARL D. GIBSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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